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Abstract
Federal law both cultivates and regulates employer-sponsored pension plans in the United States. Some
believe that because employers have been migrating away from traditional defined benefit pension plans
in the United States, the plan cultivation provisions of federal law have failed to encourage U.S. employers
to offer pension benefits to their employees. However, Congress has allowed each employer to decide for
itself whether to provide pension benefits to its employees and, if so, what kind of pension benefits to
provide. Employers appear to have migrated away from traditional defined benefit plans primarily because
employers have concluded that defined contribution plans and some hybrid plans are more compatible
with their own interests and the interests of their employees than are traditional defined benefit plans.
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Chapter 11
Cultivating Pension Plans
John M. Vine

The Internal Revenue Code (the Code) and the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) cultivate employer-sponsored pension plans
in the United States. The former does this by offering advantageous tax
treatment to tax-qualiﬁed pension plans, plan sponsors, and participating
employees and their beneﬁciaries; and the latter by facilitating employer
administration of employer-sponsored pension plans. Nevertheless, the
Code and ERISA do not merely cultivate employer-sponsored pension
plans: they also regulate employer-sponsored pension plans. In order for
an employer-sponsored pension plan to be tax-qualiﬁed and to be eligible
for the tax advantages that ﬂow from tax-qualiﬁcation, the plan must meet
regulatory requirements imposed by the Code. Similarly, although ERISA
does not require an employer to maintain a pension plan, ERISA requires
any pension plan that an employer adopts to meet ERISA’s regulatory
requirements.
Some believe that the cultivation provisions and the regulatory provisions
are colliding. One reason for this belief is theoretical: regulatory requirements, standing by themselves, can discourage employers from sponsoring
pension plans, prevent employees from earning pension beneﬁts, and
thereby defeat the objectives of the plan cultivation provisions. Another
reason for this belief is empirical: corporate employers in the United States
have been migrating away from deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) plans for the past
30 years. Since the mid-1980s, relatively few new DB plans have been
established in the private sector, and many previously established DB plans
in the private sector have been closed to new hires, amended to halt the
accrual of beneﬁts for some or all employees (that is, ‘frozen’), or terminated. In addition, some DB plans in the private sector have transferred a
portion of their liabilities to insurers. Increasingly, corporate employers
have chosen to provide pension beneﬁts exclusively through deﬁned contribution (DC) plans (EBSA 2013).
Employers have migrated away from traditional DB plans for a variety of
reasons. Employers have sought, among other things, to avoid the volatile
pension expenses that DB plans impose on employers that sponsor DB
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plans, to provide pension beneﬁts that employees understand, and to provide pension beneﬁts that employees value more highly than the beneﬁts
provided by traditional DB plans. In addition, employers have sought to
allocate pension beneﬁts among participating employees more evenly than
do many traditional DB plans, to reduce the risk of class action litigation
challenging the design or administration of DB plans, and to avoid the need
to comply with the regulatory requirements imposed on DB plans by the
Code and ERISA. Also, due to the increasingly severe limits that the Code
imposes on the beneﬁts that a tax-qualiﬁed plan may provide, nonqualiﬁed
plans have become responsible for an increasing share of the retirement
beneﬁts of corporate executives. As a result, top corporate executives have
grown less reluctant to approve proposals to close, freeze, or terminate
broad-based tax-qualiﬁed DB plans in which the top executives have a
relatively small personal stake.
Notwithstanding the migration of corporate employers away from DB
plans, the plan cultivation provisions in the Code and ERISA appear to
have encouraged employers to establish and maintain DC plans. This suggests that, far from being stymied by the regulatory provisions, the plan
cultivation provisions have succeeded in promoting the growth of DC plans.
After all, these provisions are designed to allow each employer to determine
what (if any) beneﬁt plans it will adopt and what beneﬁts it will provide,
based on its assessment of what plans and beneﬁts are in its own and its
employees’ best interests. It appears that, for a variety of reasons, many
employers now believe that DC plans do a better job of meeting both their
needs and their employees’ needs than do DB plans.

Before ERISA
Federal Tax Laws
Before the enactment of ERISA in 1974, corporate pension plans in the
United States were regulated principally by the federal tax laws. In general,
an employer was free to decide whether to sponsor a pension plan, to
determine the beneﬁts that the plan would provide, and to establish the
terms on which beneﬁts would be provided, subject to the employer’s
collective bargaining obligations, if any.
Since the very early days of the federal income tax, the federal tax laws
have granted favorable tax treatment to tax-qualiﬁed plans. The Revenue
Act of 1921 conferred tax-exempt status on a trust that was part of an
employer’s stock bonus or proﬁt sharing plan for ‘some or all of [the
employer’s] employees’ (Revenue Act of 1921: §219(f)). In 1926, this provision was expanded to include pension plans (Revenue Act of 1926: §219(f)).
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The US Treasury, however, became dissatisﬁed with the 1921 Act’s ‘some
or all’ coverage standard. In 1937, the Treasury informed Congress that,
although the Code’s pension provisions had been intended to ‘encourage
pension trusts for aged employees,’ the pension provisions had been
‘twisted into a means of tax avoidance by the creation of pension trusts’
covering ‘only small groups of ofﬁcers and directors who are in the high
income brackets.’ The Treasury proposed replacing the ‘some or all’ coverage standard with a requirement that a qualiﬁed pension plan cover a
‘reasonable number’ of employees (US Congress 1937: 294).
Congress did not act on the Treasury’s 1937 proposal, however, and in
1942 the Treasury presented Congress with a revised proposal that gave
greater emphasis to the objective of covering rank-and-ﬁle employees:
The present treatment of pension trusts affords a tax subsidy to those trusts which
meet the requirements set forth in the statute. This subsidy is at the expense of the
general body of taxpayers. It was granted because of the desire to improve the welfare
of employees by encouraging the establishment of pension trusts for their beneﬁt.
Our purpose in presenting our suggestions was to carry out this objective of the
Congress by suggesting various provisions which would both make the present statute
more effective in promoting the welfare of employees through such trusts and at the
same time prevent utilization of such trusts for tax-avoidance purposes. (US Treasury
1942: 2405–6)

Congress responded favorably to this proposal, passing the Revenue Act
of 1942 which required a tax-qualiﬁed plan to beneﬁt either (1) at least
70 percent of all employees (or at least 80 percent of all eligible employees if
at least 70 percent of all employees were eligible) or (2) employees who
qualiﬁed under a classiﬁcation established by the employer and found by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue not to discriminate in favor of
employees who were ofﬁcers, shareholders, supervisors, or highly compensated employees (the prohibited group). The 1942 Act also provided that a
plan would not be treated as tax-qualiﬁed unless the contributions or
beneﬁts under the plan did not discriminate in favor of employees
who were members of the prohibited group. The House Ways and Means
Committee explained that the new requirements were designed ‘to insure
that [tax-qualiﬁed] plans are operated for the welfare of employees in
general, and to prevent the trust device from being used for the beneﬁt of
shareholders, ofﬁcials [sic], or highly-paid employees’ (H.R. Rep. No. 2333
1942: 103–4).
The pre-ERISA version of the Code provided tax rules that encouraged
employers to maintain tax-qualiﬁed pension plans. The tax rules governing
tax-qualiﬁed plans provided for current deductibility (within limits) of
employer contributions, deferred recognition of income by plan participants, and a tax-exemption for the plan itself. Participants in tax-qualiﬁed
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plans also received advantageous tax treatment for certain plan distributions. For example, the Code treated the income that was included in a
lump-sum distribution from a plan as long-term capital gain rather than as
ordinary income. Also, a participant who received a distribution of appreciated employer securities in a lump-sum distribution from a tax-qualiﬁed
plan could exclude the appreciation from income until the securities were
sold.
Before the enactment of ERISA, some employers provided pension beneﬁts for both upper echelon and rank-and-ﬁle employees on an unfunded,
pay-as-you-go basis, rather than through a funded, tax-qualiﬁed plan.
Because an unfunded plan did not allow an employer to claim up-front
deductions for its contributions to the plan, was not funded by a tax-exempt
trust, and was not subject to the special rules for plan distributions, an
unfunded plan was less tax-effective than a tax-qualiﬁed plan. The Internal
Revenue Service’s position at the time was that an unfunded plan could not
be tax-qualiﬁed (Rev. Rul. 71–91 1971).
The Code did not require a pension plan to comply with the Code’s taxqualiﬁcation requirements. However, if an employer wished to maintain a
funded pension plan in which employees had vested interests, a taxqualiﬁed plan was usually the most advantageous option. The Tax Reform
Act of 1969 made it particularly unattractive for an employee to have a
vested interest in a nonqualiﬁed, funded deferred compensation plan: the
employee was required to include the value of his or her vested beneﬁts in
income before the plan distributed the beneﬁts to the employee (Joint
Committee 1970).

Other laws
Before the enactment of ERISA, no federal law comprehensively regulated
pension plans. The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act (WPPDA)
imposed only modest disclosure requirements and, at least until 1962, the
WPPDA relied solely on individual employees for enforcement. The LaborManagement Relations Act applied only to employee beneﬁt funds that
were administered jointly by employers and unions. Although criminal
penalties applied to theft, embezzlement, and bribery involving employee
beneﬁt plans, criminal penalties were not effective in curbing beneﬁt plan
abuses (H.R. Rep. No. 533 1973; S. Rep. No. 127 1973).
A few states also had enacted laws speciﬁcally designed to regulate the
administration of employee beneﬁt plans, but these state laws were not
uniform. Moreover, although the state-law rules were generally based on
the common law of trusts, it was unclear whether the common law of trusts
applied to plans that were not funded by traditional trust arrangements. In
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any event, individual states did not appear to be up to the task of adequately
protecting the interests of plan participants and beneﬁciaries in multi-state
beneﬁt plans (H.R. Rep. No. 533 1973; S. Rep. No. 127 1973; Bureau of
National Affairs 1962).

The Prologue to ERISA
In 1962, President Kennedy called for a review of the rules governing the tax
treatment and investment policies of corporate pension funds and private
retirement programs, and created a Cabinet-level committee (the Committee) to review the implications of the growing array of retirement and
welfare funds. The Committee was called the President’s Committee on
Corporate Pension Funds and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs, and the members of the Committee were the Secretary of Labor, the
Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,
the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, and the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
The Committee’s Report, issued in 1965, observed that Congress had long
recognized both ‘the importance of stimulating the development of private
retirement plans’ and ‘the growing importance of establishing standards
and regulations’ to assure that the plans serve the public interest (President’s Committee 1965: 18). The Report concluded that ‘public policy
should continue to provide appropriate incentives to private plan growth’
and, by improving the plans’ soundness and equitable character, ‘set a
ﬁrmer foundation for their future development’ (President’s Committee
1965: 25).
The Report also emphasized two aspects of the tax treatment of taxqualiﬁed plans. The ﬁrst was the mismatch between the immediate deductibility of employer contributions to the plan and the deferred recognition of
income by participants until they received distributions from the plan. The
second was the tax-exempt status of the plan itself. The Report concluded
that taxpayers were indirectly subsidizing pension plans, and observed that,
without the advantageous tax treatment of qualiﬁed pension plans, employees and employers would have to contribute far more if they wished to
maintain the current level of pension beneﬁts (President’s Committee
1965).
The Report set the stage for a decade-long study of private pension plans
that culminated in the enactment of ERISA in 1974. The Report recommended several steps including legislation governing such subjects as participation, vesting, funding, coverage, nondiscrimination, disclosure, limits
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on beneﬁts and contributions, and limits on investments in employer securities. The Report also proposed repeal of the rules giving favorable tax
treatment to lump-sum distributions and to distributions of appreciated
employer securities, and recommended study of a number of other subjects,
including pension portability and termination insurance (President’s Committee 1965).
Although the Report was very inﬂuential, additional interest in pension
reform was stimulated by other events, including evidence of corruption in
the administration of multiemployer plans that emerged from Congressional investigations during the early 1950s, and the termination of the
Studebaker pension plan in 1963, which caused over 4,000 workers with
vested pension rights to lose some or all of their beneﬁts (H.R. Rep. No. 533
1973; S. Rep. No. 127 1973; Wooten 2004: 73–8).

ERISA
Enacted in 1974, ERISA was designed to protect participants’ interests in
pension plans, not to require employers to maintain pension plans. ERISA
regulated pensions by imposing minimum standards on plans (covering
such matters as participation, vesting, beneﬁt distribution, and funding),
by requiring most DB plans to participate in a national plan termination
insurance program, and by subjecting pension plans to reporting and
disclosure, ﬁduciary responsibility, and enforcement provisions.
Congress was concerned, however, that regulatory provisions could do
more harm than good. Congress recognized that regulatory provisions
would protect employees only if employers elected to maintain pension
plans for them and that employers’ willingness to maintain pension plans
voluntarily could not be taken for granted. Regulatory provisions could
discourage employers from adopting pension plans, encourage employers
to terminate existing plans, or both, reducing the number of plans, the
number of covered employees, and the value of the beneﬁts the plans would
distribute. To counteract the potentially self-defeating consequences of
ERISA’s regulatory provisions, Congress included in ERISA provisions that
were designed to cultivate pension plans. A leading account of ERISA’s
enactment concluded that ‘Congress chose less stringent measures than it
might have because legislators believed that stricter regulation would overburden plan sponsors . . . Protective measures increase costs, which may lead
employers to shut down a plan or reduce beneﬁts’ (Wooten 2004: 272).
In order to encourage employers to award their employees enforceable
pension rights under voluntary employer-provided pension plans, Congress
sought to strike a balance between plan cultivation and plan regulation. The
United States Supreme Court (the Supreme Court) later observed that:
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ERISA represents a careful balancing between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the encouragement of the creation of such plans.
Congress sought to create a system that is [not] so complex that administrative costs,
or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering [ERISA] plans in
the ﬁrst place. (Conkright v. Frommert 2010: 517)

Each of the four Senate and House committees responsible for the bills that
became ERISA expressed its intent to foster the establishment and growth of
voluntary employer-sponsored plans. (Pertinent portions of the committee
reports are set forth in Appendix Table 11.A1.)
The statement of purpose in Title IV of ERISA (Plan Termination Insurance) formally proclaimed Congress’s intent to cultivate pension plans:
The purposes of this title, which are to be carried out by the [Pension Beneﬁt
Guaranty Corporation], are—(1) to encourage the continuation and maintenance
of voluntary private pension plans for the beneﬁt of their participants,
(2) to provide for the timely and uninterrupted payment of pension beneﬁts to
participants and beneﬁciaries under plans to which this title applies, and
(3) to maintain premiums established by the [PBGC] under section 4006 at
the lowest level consistent with carrying out its obligations under this title. (ERISA
§4002(a))

Congress’s intent was also carried out by the ERISA provisions governing
plan management and administration, employer securities, vesting, and
preemption.

Plan management and administration
ERISA requires every employee beneﬁt plan to be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument that (1) provides a procedure for
establishing and carrying out a funding policy and method that is consistent
with the plan’s objectives and ERISA’s requirements; (2) describes any
procedure under the plan for allocating administrative responsibilities;
(3) provides a procedure for amending the plan; and (4) speciﬁes the basis
on which payments are made to and from the plan. ERISA also requires plan
ﬁduciaries to discharge their duties in accordance with the plan’s governing
documents and instruments insofar as they are consistent with Titles I and IV
of ERISA. Finally, ERISA permits a plan participant or beneﬁciary to bring a
civil action to recover beneﬁts due under the terms of the plan, to enforce his
or her rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his or her rights to
beneﬁts under the terms of the plan (ERISA §§402(b), 502(a)).
These provisions both regulate and cultivate employee beneﬁt plans.
Because of these provisions, employees can ascertain their beneﬁts, can
enforce their beneﬁt rights, and are protected from claims that unwritten

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/12/2015, SPi

190

Reimagining Pensions

amendments have eliminated their beneﬁt rights under the plan. As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed,
ERISA § 402(a)(1) was designed to ensure that every employee may, on examining
the plan documents, determine exactly what his rights and obligations are under the
plan. Employees entitled to rely on the terms of a written beneﬁt plan should not
have their beneﬁts eroded by oral modiﬁcations to the . . . plan. Congress, in passing
ERISA, did not intend that participants in employee beneﬁt plans should be left to
the uncertainties of oral communications in ﬁnding out precisely what rights they
were given under their plan. (Hamilton v. Air Jamaica, Ltd. 1991: 78–9)

ERISA’s plan document provisions also help to provide certainty to plan
sponsors and plan administrators: they help to deﬁne the employer’s ﬁnancial obligation to the plan, facilitate efﬁcient, reliable, and consistent plan
administration, and provide a plan amendment procedure that can be
invoked to make changes in the plan. The Supreme Court has stated:
[H]aving an amendment procedure enables plan administrators, the people who
manage the plan on a day-to-day level, to have a mechanism for sorting out, from
among the occasional corporate communications that pass through their ofﬁces and
that conﬂict with the existing plan terms, the bona ﬁde amendments from those that
are not. (Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen 1995: 82)

Moreover, ERISA treats the act of amending or terminating a plan as a
settlor function rather than as a ﬁduciary function. ERISA provides that
a person is a ﬁduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (1) he exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan
or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its
assets, (2) he renders investment advice for a fee . . . with respect to any moneys or
property of such plan . . . , or (3) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administration of such plan. (ERISA §3(21)(A))

Because ERISA’s deﬁnition of ‘ﬁduciary’ focuses on plan management, plan
administration, and investment advice, an employer does not act in a
ﬁduciary capacity, and is not subject to ERISA’s ﬁduciary standards, when
it acts as the plan’s sponsor or ‘settlor,’ such as when it decides whether to
establish, amend, or terminate a plan. ERISA’s deﬁnition of ‘ﬁduciary’ thus
allows employers to design their plans as they see ﬁt, subject only to the
substantive requirements of ERISA and without their design decisions being
made subject to judicial review for compliance with ERISA’s ﬁduciary
standards.
The settlor function doctrine—under which plan design decisions are
outside the scope of ERISA’s ﬁduciary responsibility standards—is fundamental to plan cultivation. Employers would undoubtedly be reluctant to
adopt employee beneﬁt plans if employers were treated as ﬁduciaries (and
were subject to ERISA’s ﬁduciary standards) when they adopt, amend, or
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terminate a plan and were therefore required, for example, to make design
decisions solely in the interest of plan participants. Because the settlor
function doctrine recognizes that ERISA’s ﬁduciary standards do not apply
to decisions to establish, amend, or terminate a plan, the settlor function
doctrine advances the objective of plan cultivation by giving plan sponsors
considerable latitude to design plans as they see ﬁt.
The Supreme Court has distinguished plan design decisions (nonﬁduciary decisions that ERISA leaves largely to the plan’s settlor) from
decisions regarding plan management and administration (ﬁduciary decisions that are governed by ERISA’s ﬁduciary responsibility standards). In
Lockheed Corp. v. Spink (1996), the Supreme Court ruled that Lockheed did
not act in a ﬁduciary capacity when it amended its pension plan to add an
early retirement incentive that was payable to employees who retired early
and who released any employment-related claims they might have against
Lockheed. The Court emphasized that ‘only when fulﬁlling certain deﬁned
functions does a person become a ﬁduciary’ under ERISA and that the
functions speciﬁed by ERISA’s deﬁnition of ﬁduciary ‘do not include plan
design.’ The Court went on to say that ‘ERISA leaves th[e] question of the
content of beneﬁts to the private parties creating the plan . . . [T]he private
parties, not the Government, control the level of beneﬁts’ (Lockheed Corp. v.
Spink 1996: 887–90, 894).
In addition, ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules—which bar transactions
that Congress deemed potentially abusive—include an exemption that
accommodates employer-administered plans. Set forth in ERISA §408(c)
(3), the exemption provides that the prohibited transaction rules do not
forbid the same person from serving both as a plan ﬁduciary and as an
ofﬁcer, employee, agent, or other representative of a party in interest (such
as the sponsoring employer). The exemption authorizes a signiﬁcant
departure from the prototypical arrangement under the common law of
trusts in which the trust is administered by a disinterested ﬁduciary.1
Although the §408(c)(3) exemption does not relieve a ﬁduciary of its
obligations under ERISA’s general ﬁduciary standards, such as the duty of
prudence, the exemption makes it clear that a ﬁduciary’s status as a representative of the employer does not violate ERISA’s prohibited transaction
rules.

Employer securities
The President’s Committee also called for changes in the treatment of plan
investments in employer securities. The Committee concluded that, in
assessing investments in employer securities, it was impossible to rely on
the same standards of investment judgment that could be expected to
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prevail when a ﬁduciary made other investments and that investing a large
percentage of a plan’s assets in a single equity security subjected the plan to
inappropriate risks. The Committee recommended a limit of ‘perhaps 10
percent’ on the portion of a pension plan’s assets that could be invested in
employer securities (President’s Committee 1965: 76).
The Committee also criticized the income tax rules governing appreciated employer securities received in a lump-sum distribution from a taxqualiﬁed plan. Under those rules, any increase in the value of the securities
over their cost to the plan was not included in the employee’s gross income
until the securities were sold. The Committee recommended repeal of those
rules on the grounds that (1) only a relatively small percentage of plan
participants could take advantage of the rules and (2) the rules artiﬁcially
encouraged investment in employer securities (President’s Committee
1965: 66).
Nevertheless, Congress implemented only some of the Committee’s
recommendations regarding employer securities. On the one hand, ERISA’s ﬁduciary standards imposed a duty to diversify plan assets, imposed a 10
percent limit on investments in employer securities and employer real
property, and curbed self-dealing. On the other hand, ERISA modiﬁed
these restrictions to accommodate investments in employer securities by
eligible individual account plans (EIAPs) and employee stock ownership
plans (ESOPs). In general terms, ERISA deﬁned an EIAP as (1) an individual account plan that explicitly provides for the acquisition of employer
stock and that is a proﬁt-sharing, stock bonus, thrift, or savings plan, (2) an
ESOP, or (3) a money purchase pension plan that was in existence on
September 2, 1974, and that on that date invested primarily in employer
stock. ERISA deﬁned an ESOP as an individual account plan that is a stock
bonus plan, or stock bonus plan and money purchase plan, that is taxqualiﬁed, that is designed to invest primarily in employer stock, and that
meets any other requirements imposed by Treasury Department regulations
(ERISA §407(d)(3) & (6); Treas. Reg. §54.4975–11; 29 C.F.R. §2550.407d–6).
ERISA exempted EIAPs (including ESOPs) from both ERISA’s diversiﬁcation requirements and its 10 percent limit on the portion of plan assets
that may be invested in employer securities. In addition, ERISA exempted
an EIAP’s purchases and sales of employer securities from ERISA’s generally
applicable ban on party-in-interest transactions and permitted an ESOP to
borrow from the employer in order to invest in employer securities (White v.
Marshall & Ilsley Corp. 2013).2 Moreover, ERISA did not change the income
tax treatment of unrealized appreciation on employer securities, as the
President’s Committee had recommended. Instead, ERISA reduced the
disparity between the income tax treatment of distributions of appreciated
employer securities and the income tax treatment of other distributions by
making many other distributions eligible for tax-free rollover.
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Vesting
ERISA’s vesting provisions both regulate and cultivate beneﬁt plans.
Although ERISA’s detailed vesting and beneﬁt accrual requirements are
regulatory measures, ERISA’s vesting requirements apply to a beneﬁt only if
the beneﬁt is classiﬁed by ERISA as an accrued beneﬁt (ERISA 203(a)). As a
result, many valuable pension beneﬁts, such as early retirement subsidies
and disability beneﬁts, are exempted from ERISA’s vesting requirements.
ERISA’s plan cultivation provisions played a central role in the Supreme
Court’s 1981 ruling regarding the application of ERISA’s vesting provisions to
an offset provision in a pension plan’s beneﬁt formula (Alessi v. RaybestosManhattan, Inc. 1981). The offset provision reduced a participant’s gross
pension beneﬁt by the amount of any workers’ compensation payments
that the participant was entitled to receive. The Court ruled that the offset
did not violate ERISA’s vesting standards. According to the Court, the plaintiffs’ vesting claim overlooked the fact that the private party creating the plan
(the settlor) typically ‘deﬁnes the content of the beneﬁt that, once vested,
cannot be forfeited . . . Rather than imposing mandatory pension levels or
methods for calculating beneﬁts, Congress in ERISA set outer bounds on
permissible accrual practices’ (Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. 1981: 511–12).
ERISA also cultivated welfare beneﬁts, such as severance beneﬁts and
retiree health beneﬁts, by exempting welfare beneﬁts from its vesting and
beneﬁt accrual requirements. The welfare beneﬁt exemption was motivated
by Congress’s concern that the application of the vesting and beneﬁt accrual
requirements to welfare beneﬁts would signiﬁcantly complicate plan administration, increase the cost of providing welfare beneﬁts, and discourage
employers from maintaining welfare beneﬁt plans. As the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed,
Congress plainly did not impose as stringent vesting requirements as it might have.
We can hardly attribute that decision to oversight, however. Having made a fundamental decision not to require employers to provide any beneﬁt plans, Congress was
forced to balance its desire to regulate extant plans more extensively against the
danger that increased regulation would deter employers from creating such plans in
the ﬁrst place. In other words, although ERISA was clearly designed to promote the
interests of employees and their beneﬁciaries in employee beneﬁt plans, the statute
was also designed to minimiz[e] the adverse impact of cost increases imposed on
employers by the tougher regulation . . . Congress’s concern with minimizing employers’ compliance costs is especially evident in ERISA’s accrual and vesting provisions.
Before determining appropriate minimum vesting requirements for pension plans,
the Senate Subcommittee on Labor commissioned an independent actuarial study to
determine the range of estimated costs to private pension plans resulting from
compliance with minimum vesting requirements under several proposed minimum
vesting standards. (Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners 1990: 1160; Gable v. Sweetheart Cup
Co. 1994: 859–60)
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The courts have found that the welfare plan exemption furthered the
interests of employees because the knowledge that they could reduce or
eliminate welfare beneﬁts made employers more willing to provide those
beneﬁts, and because employees remained free to bargain with their
employers for the vesting of welfare beneﬁts (Hamilton v. Air Jamaica, Ltd.
1991).

Preemption
ERISA’s preemption provision states that ERISA ‘shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
beneﬁt plan’ (ERISA §514(a)). The Supreme Court has interpreted this
provision to advance ERISA’s plan cultivation agenda. The Supreme Court
observed that ‘[a] patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefﬁciencies in beneﬁt program operation, which might lead those
employers with existing plans to reduce beneﬁts, and those without such
plans to refrain from adopting them. Pre-emption assures that the administrative practices of a beneﬁt plan will be governed by only a single set of
regulations’ (Fort Halifax v. Coyne 1987: 11).
For example, in 1987, the Supreme Court considered whether ERISA
preempted a Mississippi common-law cause of action alleging improper
processing of a beneﬁt claim under an insured employee beneﬁt plan. In
ruling that ERISA preempted the Mississippi law, the Court relied on
ERISA’s comprehensive civil enforcement scheme which, the Court said,
‘represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims
settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of employee beneﬁt plans.’ The Court concluded that ERISA’s
enforcement regime would be undermined if a participant were free to
obtain remedies under state law that were not available under §502 of
ERISA. (Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux 1987: 54; Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila
2004 (holding that ERISA preempted a Texas cause of action that duplicates
or supplements an ERISA cause of action)).
In 1990, the Supreme Court held that ERISA preempted a Texas wrongful
discharge statute that had been construed to apply to an employee who
allegedly was terminated because the employer sought to avoid making
pension contributions on his behalf. Based on ERISA’s broad preemption
provision and its larger purpose in ‘encouraging the formation of employee
beneﬁt plans,’ the Court ruled that ERISA preempted such state-law claims
(Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon 1990: 143–4).
In 2001, the Supreme Court also held that ERISA preempted a State of
Washington statute providing that the designation of a spouse as the beneﬁciary of a nonprobate asset is automatically revoked upon divorce. The
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Court ruled that the Washington statute subverted two key features of
ERISA’s plan cultivation provisions: the plan document requirement and
nationally uniform plan administration (Egelhoff v. Egelhoff 2001).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also has
invoked ERISA’s cultivation objectives to support its ruling that ERISA
does not preempt malpractice actions against actuaries and other professionals who provided services to employee beneﬁt plans. The court of
appeals observed that ‘immunizing actuaries could harm the ﬁnancial
integrity of the plans Congress intended to protect’ (Gerosa v. Savasta &
Co. 2003: 329).

Post-ERISA Legislation
Following ERISA’s enactment, Congress continued to encourage employers
to maintain or contribute to pension plans via three important pieces of
legislation. One was the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of
1980 (MPPAA), which declared it to be federal policy ‘to alleviate certain
problems which tend to discourage the maintenance and growth of multiemployer pension plans’ (MPPAA 1980: §3(c)(2)). The second was the
Single-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986 (SEPPAA), which
declared it to be federal policy ‘to encourage the maintenance and growth
of single-employer deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans’ (SEPPAA 1986: §11002
(c)(2)). And the third was the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA), which
encouraged the adoption of hybrid pension plans (cash balance and pension equity plans) by, among other things, settling the long-standing dispute
over whether a DB plan may express a participant’s beneﬁt on the basis of
the participant’s account balance and by explaining how an account-based
DB plan can comply with statutory restrictions on forfeitures and age discrimination (PPA 2006).
In addition, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 overhauled the Code’s coverage
and nondiscrimination provisions to advance the objective of providing
pension beneﬁts to rank-and-ﬁle employees. The Senate Finance Committee report for the 1986 Act explained that, although the coverage provisions
were originally intended as anti-abuse measures, the Committee’s current
intent was to assure that the tax incentives provided by the Code’s qualiﬁed
plan provisions encouraged employers to sponsor plans that covered rankand-ﬁle employees:
For many years, the committee has supported measures that provide tax incentives
designed to encourage employers to provide retirement beneﬁts for rank-and-ﬁle
employees. It has been the committee’s intention that these tax incentives, which are
more valuable for individuals with high levels of income because of their marginal
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tax rates, should be available to employers only if their plans provide beneﬁts for
rank-and-ﬁle employees.
Coverage tests for qualiﬁed plans originally were provided by remedial legislation in
1942 to prevent abuses. The committee is now concerned that current interpretations of the coverage tests for qualiﬁed plans, by permitting large disparities in the
coverage of highly compensated employees and nonhighly compensated employees,
are not sufﬁcient to ensure broad, nondiscriminatory coverage of rank-and-ﬁle
employees. The coverage rules provided by the bill are intended by the committee
to deny tax beneﬁts to plans in which the percentage of highly compensated
employees who beneﬁt under a plan is unreasonably in excess of the percentage of
other employees beneﬁting under the plan. (S. Rep. No. 313 1985: 578)

After enacting ERISA, Congress has continued to enact legislation encouraging employers to offer employer securities as investments or investment
options under ESOPs.3

Employer Migration
In the past 30 years, very few private sector employers have adopted new DB
plans, and many sponsors that had previously adopted DB plans have now
shut them down to one extent or another. Some employers have terminated
their DB plans, while others have closed their DB plans to new entrants. Yet
others have frozen accruals under their DB plans for some or all participants. Of late, some DB plans have reduced their liabilities (and their assets)
by purchasing annuities (and thereby transferring a portion of their liabilities to insurance companies) or by allowing retired participants to take their
beneﬁts as lump-sum cash payments.
According to the Employee Beneﬁts Security Administration (EBSA), the
number of DB plans in the US reached its peak in the mid-1980s, when there
were approximately 170,000 single-employer DB plans in the private sector.
(See Tables 11.1 and 11.2.) By 2011, only 44,000 or so were left (roughly
25 percent of the corresponding mid-1980s number). In 1984, there were
approximately 24 million active participants in single-employer DB plans,
but in 2011, there were about 12 million (about 50 percent of the corresponding 1984 number) (EBSA 2013).4 While the numbers for singleemployer DB plans have plummeted, the corresponding numbers for
single-employer DC plans have skyrocketed, as shown by Tables 11.1 and
11.2. A DC plan with an elective deferral feature, the 401(k) plan, is now the
predominant form of retirement plan. About 75 percent of all corporate
retirement plans (513,496 out of a total of 680,899 in 2011) are designated
as 401(k) plans, and 401(k) plans cover about 75 percent of all active
retirement plan participants. (EBSA 2013).
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table 11.1 Number of plans
Type of plan

1985

2001

2011

Increase (Decrease)
1985–2011

DB plan
DC plan

167,911
461,158

45,159
685,375

43,813
637,086

(124,098)
175,928

Total

629,069

730,534

680,899

51,830

Source : EBSA 2013: 1.

table 11.2 Number of active plan participants
Type of plan

1985

2001

2011

Increase (Decrease)
1985–2011

DB plan
DC plan

23,336,000
32,237,000

17,105,000
50,090,000

12,327,000
70,278,000

(11,009,000)
38,041,000

Total

55,573,000

67,195,000

82,606,000

27,033,000

Source : EBSA 2013: 9.

Moreover, many of the remaining DB plans look quite different from the
traditional ‘ﬁnal average pay’ plan. Under a ﬁnal average pay plan, a
participant’s accrued beneﬁt is typically expressed as an annuity commencing as of the participant’s normal retirement age, with the size of the
annuity based on the participant’s years of service and ﬁnal average pay.
Many employers have now converted their traditional DB plans to cash
balance or other hybrid forms, such as pension equity plans. Under a typical
cash balance plan, for example, a participant’s beneﬁt is expressed as an
account balance, and the participant’s account is credited each year with a
pay credit (a percentage of the participant’s current compensation) and an
interest credit (a percentage of the participant’s account balance). According to a Towers Watson report, only seven of that year’s Fortune 100
companies offered new hires a traditional DB plan (down from 89 in
1985), and only 30 of that year’s Fortune 100 companies offered a DB
plan of any kind to new hires (down from 90 in 1985) (McFarland 2013).
See Table 11.3.
Although there is no doubt that employers have migrated away from DB
plans, it is not clear why this migration has occurred. It seems unlikely that a
single explanation could possibly account for the behavior of thousands of
unafﬁliated employers—publicly owned and closely held, for-proﬁt and
non-proﬁt, large and small—over a thirty-year period. Indeed, there may
be no single explanation that accounts for the behavior of many individual
employers. Several explanations have been offered, including a desire to
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table 11.3 Fortune 100 company offerings to new hires
Type of retirement plan for new hires
Traditional DB plan
Hybrid DB retirement plan
Total DB plans
DC plan only

1985

2002

2013

89
1
90
10

48
35
83
17

7
23
30
70

Source : McFarland (2013): 1.

accommodate employee preference for a beneﬁt that is expressed as, and
that can be paid as, a portable lump-sum amount and lack of employee
appreciation for the value of a pension beneﬁt that is expressed as an
annuity. In addition, some explain the migration away from DB plans by
pointing to employer and employee preference for a beneﬁt that is allocated more evenly across the covered workforce than is a traditional DB plan
beneﬁt. Others point to employers’ desire to shed the economic and ﬁnancial accounting risks associated with DB plans, including the volatility and
unpredictability of both the contribution requirements and the ﬁnancial
accounting expense associated with DB plans, and to employers’ need to
compete effectively with (1) foreign companies whose governments provide
most of the pension beneﬁts for their employees, (2) newer domestic
companies that have never maintained a DB plan, and (3) other companies
that have already frozen or terminated their DB plans. Other explanations
that have been offered relate to employers’ desire to adjust compensation
expense in response to mounting health care costs and to top executives’
increasing reliance on top-hat plans for retirement beneﬁts. Others point to
concerns about potential for class action litigation and to excessive regulation of DB plans (Towers Watson 2012; GAO 2009; Kennedy 2008;
VanDerhei 2006; Munnell et al. 2006; Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan
2006).
Surveys often identify the regulatory burden on DB plans as one of the
reasons why employers have migrated away from DB plans. Yet published
survey reports generally do not identify which speciﬁc regulatory burdens
have been most onerous, nor do they identify excessive regulation as the
only reason, or even as the principal reason, for employer migration. The
US GAO found that employers’ principal reasons for freezing DB plans were
their funding volatility and the effects on employers’ cash ﬂows (GAO 2008:
6–7). Another GAO report regarding the nation’s largest private DB plan
sponsors found that the top three reasons for changing their DB plans for
non-bargained employees were (1) the unpredictability or volatility of the
funding requirements, (2) competitive economic pressures, and (3) trends
in employee demographics (toward an older or younger workforce) (GAO
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2009). The responses for DB plans for collectively bargained employees were
somewhat different. Here the top three reasons were (1) competitive economic pressures, (2) changes in bargaining unit demographics, and (3)
increase in contributions to DC plan as a trade-off (GAO 2009).
The vast majority (74 percent) of plan sponsors that had frozen their
pension plans reported that they could not conceive of any conditions that
would make them consider adopting a new DB plan. Only 26 percent of
plan sponsors reported that there were conditions under which they would
consider adopting a new DB plan, the top six being (1) change in accounting treatment, (2) greater effectiveness as a retention tool, (3) reduced
volatility in funding requirements, (4) DB plans becoming industry standard, (5) an increase in the tax-deductibility of contributions to DB plans (as
compared to contributions to a DC plan), and (6) reduced regulatory/
administrative requirements (GAO 2009).
A 2012 Towers Watson survey elicited similar responses. Plan sponsors
that had closed, frozen, or terminated their DB plans reported that reducing cost and cost volatility were their two principal objectives in closing,
freezing, or terminating the plan. Simplifying plan administration was near
the bottom of the list of reasons given (Towers Watson 2012).
Plan regulation appears to have contributed to the migration of employers away from DB plans. Major employers initially displayed considerable
interest in offering hybrid plans to their employees: the number of Fortune
100 companies offering a hybrid plan to new hires increased from one in
1985 to 35 in 2002. But this period of growth was followed by a marked
decline in the popularity of hybrid plans. Between 2002 and 2013, the
number of Fortune 100 companies offering a hybrid DB plan to new hires
fell from 35 to 23, and during the same period, the number of Fortune 100
companies offering only a DC plan to new hires increased sharply (from 17
to 70) (McFarland 2013).
While there may be no single explanation for the peaking of interest in
hybrid plans in 2002 and for the pronounced decline of interest thereafter,
the views of regulators at the Treasury Department and Internal Revenue
Service on hybrid plans cannot have helped. In December of 2002, the
Treasury and the Service proposed highly controversial regulations regarding
the age discrimination provisions of the Code. Employer-commenters
asserted, among other things, that the proposed regulations would (1) impose
an intricate mathematical approach that was inconsistent with the text of the
statute and Congressional intent; (2) outlaw many commonplace pension
plans, including plans that could not reasonably be considered agediscriminatory; (3) saddle cash balance plans with an excessively rigid ‘safe
harbor’; (4) subject plans and employers to the risk of years of costly litigation;
(5) impose enormous economic costs on employers that sponsor DB plans;
and (6) threaten the future of all DB plans (ERIC 2003).
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As a long-term ﬁnancial arrangement, an employer-sponsored DB plan is
subject to a variety of signiﬁcant risks. A number of those risks—such as
investment and interest rate risks—are potentially costly, difﬁcult to foresee,
and largely beyond the control of an individual employer and its employees.
The design of a plan can affect how these risks are allocated between the
sponsoring employer and participating employees. Table 11.4 identiﬁes the
principal risks that apply to pension plans and how traditional DB plans and
DC plans have allocated those risks.
The impact of investment and interest rate risks was evident during the
2000–10 decade. Because of stock market and interest rate ﬂuctuations, that
decade witnessed volatile and unpredictable swings in the values of DB plan
assets and liabilities. Low equity prices reduced the value of plan assets, and
low interest rates increased the present value of plan liabilities. During this
period, employers did not simply migrate away from DB plans; many
migrated away from DB plans to DC plans, while others migrated away
from traditional DB plans to hybrid plans.
Aaronson and Coronado (2005) found that, although there was a general
shift away from DB plans due to factors affecting all employers and employees, certain industries experienced signiﬁcantly larger increases in DC plan
coverage than others. They concluded that some employers and employees
preferred more ﬂexible, short-term employment arrangements, and therefore favored pension plans that, unlike traditional DB plans, provided for
even rates of beneﬁt accrual and did not penalize job change. Employers
preferring more ﬂexible employment relationships included companies
ﬁnding that, due to the pace of technological change, their future success
did not depend on long-term employment relationships. Employees preferring more ﬂexible, short-term relationships included mobile employees who
moved from employer to employer in search of better opportunities, members of two-earner couples whose employment decisions were affected by
the other member’s employment opportunities, and parents who had young
children and who moved in and out of the workforce depending on the
needs of their children.

Plan Design Options
Although DC plans have some advantages over DB plans, and particularly
over traditional DB plans, some employees may not be prepared to handle
the risks that DC plans impose on plan participants. Several design options
are among those available to employers concerned with employees’ ability
to bear the risks that DC plans impose on plan participants. These design
options include the following:

Because the value of the plan’s liabilities equals the value
of the plan’s assets, there generally is no interest rate risk
independent of investment risk (the risk that interest rate
changes will affect the value of the plan’s assets). (An
exception: a money purchase pension plan with a funding
waiver.)

The employer bears all of the interest rate risk. For
example, all other things being equal, a decline in interest
rates tends to increase the present value of the plan’s
liabilities (and to increase the employer’s funding
obligations and ﬁnancial accounting expense). To some
extent the effect on the present value of liabilities may be
offset by the effect of the change in interest rates on the
value of the plan’s assets.
Unless the plan provides for an automatic COLA,
participants bear the risk of inﬂation. If beneﬁts are based
on the participant’s ﬁnal pay, and the participant receives
pay increases that keep up with (or surpass) inﬂation, the
plan can help the participant to keep up with pre-retirement
inﬂation. The employer bears the cost of any increases in
beneﬁts that are attributable to a COLA or to increases in
employees’ pay levels.
Participants bear this risk, but the employer typically
determines whether the accrual rate declines. If the plan
accepts participant contributions, participants also
determine whether the contribution/accrual rate
declines.

Interest rate risk: the risk
that a change in interest
rates will cause the present
value of retirement plan
liabilities to change.

Inﬂation risk: the risk that
inﬂation will erode the
value of the beneﬁts
provided by the plan.

Accrual/contribution rate
risk: the risk that the rate at
which beneﬁts are earned
will decline.

(continued )

Participants bear this risk, but the employer typically
determines whether the contribution rate declines. If the
plan accepts participant contributions, participants also
determine whether the contribution rate declines.

Participants bear the risk of inﬂation. To the extent that
appreciation in the value of the plan’s investments keeps
up with (or surpasses) inﬂation, the plan can help a
participant to cope with inﬂation.

Plan participants bear all of the investment risk.

The employer bears all of the investment risk.

Investment risk: the risk that
the plan’s investments will
not perform as well as
expected.

DC plan

Traditional DB plan

Risk

table 11.4 Allocation of risks under DB and DC plans
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Under a DC plan, all other things (such as compensation)
being equal, beneﬁts accrue evenly over a participant’s
career, so that there is less risk to an employee’s
retirement savings if a participant switches jobs in midcareer.
Some employers provide a matching or other
contribution only to plan participants who are employed
on the last day of the year (Yang 2014).

The employer and plan participants bear this risk.
Traditional DB plans provide meaningful retirement
beneﬁts only to long-service employees. For example,
under a traditional DB plan with an early retirement
subsidy, the value of the employee’s retirement beneﬁt
can increase substantially once the employee attains early
retirement age. An employee who would otherwise be
eligible for early retirement can suffer a signiﬁcant loss in
value if the employee terminates employment before (or
after) early retirement age.
If the plan is covered by the termination insurance
program in Title IV of ERISA, both the employer and plan
participants share this risk. Depending on the employer’s
ﬁnancial condition, the employer may bear some of the
risk, and plan participants may bear the risk for beneﬁts in
excess those covered by PBGC insurance.
The presumptive form of distribution is required to be an
annuity under a DB plan. If a participant in a DB plan

Employment termination
risk: the risk that a
participant will terminate
employment before (or
after) reaching the point at
which the participant is
eligible for the beneﬁt with
the highest value under the
plan.

Plan termination risk: the
risk that the plan will
terminate without sufﬁcient
funds to meet its beneﬁt
obligations.

Longevity risk: the risk that
the participant (and any

There is a risk that the plan will terminate before the
employer makes all of the contributions that are then due
under the plan (for example, the contributions for the
then-current year). Depending on the employer’s
ﬁnancial condition, the employer and/or the plan
participant may bear the risk.

Participants typically bear this risk. The annuity purchase
rate risk typically applies under a DC plan that offers an
annuity as an optional payment method.

An annuity is typically provided by the DB plan itself
rather than by an insurer. If, however, the plan provides
annuity beneﬁts by purchasing annuity contracts from
insurers, the plan and the employer bear the annuity
purchase rate risk. Annuity purchase rates are affected by
interest rates and other factors, such as supply and
demand conditions. Annuity purchase rate risk can be
borne by participants who intend to receive beneﬁts from
the plan in a lump sum and to use the proceeds to
purchase an annuity from an insurer.

Annuity purchase rate risk:
the risk that the rate at
which annuities may be
purchased will change.

DC plan

Traditional DB plan

Risk

table 11.4 Continued

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 5/12/2015, SPi

Source : Author’s analysis.

survivor) will live longer
than anticipated and
exhaust the participant’s
retirement savings.

DB plans are permitted, however, to allow a participant to
elect (with spousal consent) to receive the actuarial
equivalent of the participant’s accrued beneﬁt in a lump
sum. If a plan distributes beneﬁts in the form of a lump
sum, the participant bears the longevity risk—and runs
the risk that the participant will spend the entire lump
sum before the participant dies—unless the participant
transfers the longevity risk to an insurer by using the lump
sum to purchase an annuity contract.

receives his or her beneﬁts from the plan as an annuity,
the plan, rather than the participant, bears the longevity
risk.

The risk falls on the participant unless the participant
transfers the risk to an insurer by using the lump sum to
purchase an annuity contract.
Typically, it is more expensive to purchase an annuity
from an insurer than it is to obtain an annuity directly
from a DB plan.
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• DC Plan Equity Fund with a Rate-of-Return Guarantee. Concerns about

the incidence of investment risk under a DC plan might be addressed
by offering investment options that provide participants with more
downside protection, such as an investment-linked variable annuity
with an investment guaranty offered by an insurance company. However, such offerings come at a price, typically in the form of higher fees,
lower investment returns, or both.
• A DB/DC Floor-Offset Arrangement. Depending on the DC plan’s
contribution formula, the DB plan’s beneﬁt formula, and the plans’
investment policies, a ﬂoor-offset arrangement might offer participants
both the upside potential of a DC plan and the downside protection of
a DB plan. Nevertheless, the funded status of the DB component of a
ﬂoor-offset plan can be even more volatile than the funded status of a
stand-alone DB plan.
• A Cash Balance Plan Offering an Investment Return. An employer
might adopt a cash balance retirement plan under which much of
the investment risk is allocated away from the employer and to plan
participants, subject to the zero cumulative ﬂoor mandated by the
Pension Protection Act of 2006, in accordance with the current proposed and ﬁnal Treasury cash balance plan regulations. In this case, the
plan’s assets can be invested in a fashion that mirrors the investments
used to determine the investment performance of the plan’s account
balances. This approach addresses employers’ concerns regarding the
volatility and unpredictability of employer contributions and expenses
under a DB plan, but it does not offer an employee much more than
what is already available under a DC plan (except that the relevant
deduction and beneﬁt limits would be the limits for DB plans).
• A Cash Balance Plan Offering an Investment Return with a Floor
Exceeding the Zero Cumulative Floor Mandated by the PPA. Under
current proposed and ﬁnal Treasury regulations, cash balance plans
are required to operate like DC plans and to shift all of the investment
risk to plan participants (subject to the zero cumulative ﬂoor mandated
by the PPA). If anticipated forthcoming Treasury Department regulations so permit, an employer might adopt a cash balance retirement
plan under which investment risk is shared by the employer and plan
participants. It remains to be seen whether the Treasury responds
afﬁrmatively to the objection made in the comments to the proposed
regulations. By combining the best features of DB and DC plans, cash
balance plans could offer participants an account-based beneﬁt that
includes a market-based rate of return with lower investment risk than a
traditional DC plan. For example, a DB plan can provide annuities at
lower cost, subsidized disability and death beneﬁts, and subsidized early
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retirement (or early retirement window) beneﬁts. Moreover, plan ﬁduciaries could ﬁnd it easier to reduce funding volatility by matching plan
investments with their plans’ future beneﬁt obligations (Shea et al. 2011).
• Investment education. It is difﬁcult to quarrel with the desirability of
providing investment education to participants in DC plans that allow
them to determine how the funds in their accounts will be invested.
The US Department of Labor’s interpretive bulletin on investment
education explains how an employer can provide investment education
without providing investment advice. By contrast, the provision of
investment advice to plan participants might qualify as ﬁduciary conduct and might therefore subject the employer and others to potential
liability as ﬁduciaries under ERISA (I.B. 1996).
• Investment advice. The US Department of Labor has also published a
regulation that allows ﬁduciaries to provide investment advice to participants in participant-directed individual account plans without violating the conﬂict-of-interest rules in the Code and ERISA. Designating an
investment advisor in accordance with the regulation is a ﬁduciary act,
however, and compliance with the regulation does not relieve the party
making the designation of the obligation to make the designation in
accordance with ERISA’s ﬁduciary standards (Investment Advice Regulation 2011).
• Payout education. If a plan offers a lump-sum option, employees
strongly favor taking their beneﬁts in the form of a lump-sum payment
when they leave the ﬁrm, regardless of whether the plan is a DB or a DC
plan. Employees who take their beneﬁts in the form of a lump-sum
payment, however, incur the risk that they will exhaust their retirement
savings before they die. A growing body of research indicates that
employees would be well-advised to address the risk that they will
outlive their retirement savings by including annuities in their investment portfolios. Many employees do not understand annuities, however, and are concerned that they don’t know enough about them to
make informed decisions. Employers are in a position to educate their
employees about annuities, but some employers remain concerned
that any assistance that they provide will expose them to ﬁduciary
liability under ERISA (Purcell 2009).

Conclusion
The basic policy decision that the US Congress made in the Code and
ERISA was that the employer, not the government, should decide whether
the employer will offer beneﬁt plans to its employees and, if so, that the
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employer, not the government, should select the beneﬁt plans and the
beneﬁts that will be offered. Moreover, the plan cultivation provisions in
ERISA and the Code apply to both DB and DC plans and are designed to
encourage employers to maintain the beneﬁt plans that they prefer, not to
require employers to maintain a particular type of plan. If the plan cultivation provisions were fundamentally ﬂawed, one would expect to observe
migration away from both DB and DC plans. Nevertheless, during the period
from 1985 to 2011, the number of active participants in single-employer DC
plans has more than doubled. During the same period, the percentage of
Fortune 100 companies offering new hires some form of retirement plan has
remained constant at 100 percent.
The differences between DB and DC plans, and between traditional
pension plans and hybrid plans, suggest that the migration away from
traditional DB plans was attributable primarily to employers’ desire to
avoid volatile and unpredictable swings in contribution requirements
and ﬁnancial accounting expenses, paired with employers’ and employees’
preference for plans that allocate beneﬁts more evenly than do traditional
DB plans. Although concerns about the burdens imposed by the regulatory
provisions of the Code and ERISA appear to have inﬂuenced employers’
decision-making, particularly with respect to the movement away from
DB plans during the past decade, such concerns do not appear to have
been the primary cause of the migration away from traditional DB plans in
general.

Appendix
Appendix table 11.A1 ERISA committee reports
Committee

Report Text

Senate Committee on Labor
& Public Welfare
S. Rep. No. 127 1973: 8, 13,
18–19

‘Although the need for legislative reform has been and
continues to be widely acknowledged among all persons
and sectors affected, governmental supervision of
mandated and essential improvements has been resisted
due to the belief that such legislation might impede plan
growth. However, as the Committee has progressed in its
inquiries and made public disclosures of its analysis and
ﬁndings, it has been discerned that some resistance has
been dissipated and various opponents have now
acknowledged that such reforms will not deter the
establishment or the improvement of pension plans.’
‘The enactment of progressive and effective pension
legislation . . . should serve to encourage rather than
diminish efforts by management and industry to expand
pension plan coverage and to improve beneﬁts for
workers.’
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‘The Committee also concluded that an exemption for
plans of small size was necessary in order to prevent
discouraging small employers from establishing pension
plans . . . . While reasonable men may differ in their
judgment as to whether a small plan exemption would
encourage greater expansion of private pension plans
among small businessmen, it is the Committee’s judgment
that subjecting all plans, regardless of size, to the standards
of this Act could have an inhibiting effect on future private
pension expansion.’
Senate Committee on
Finance
S. Rep. 383 1973: 1, 10–11,
18–19

‘The [bill] as reported by the committee is designed to
make pension, proﬁt-sharing, and stock bonus plans more
effective in providing retirement income for employees
who have spent their careers in useful and socially
productive work. It encourages provision for the retirement
needs of many millions of individuals. At the same time, the
committee recognizes that private retirement plans are
voluntary on the part of the employer, and, therefore, it has
carefully weighed the additional costs to the employer and
has minimized them to the extent consistent with the
minimum standards for retirement beneﬁts.’
‘A fundamental aspect of present law, which the committee
bill continues, is reliance on voluntary action by employers
(and employees under contributory plans) for the
establishment of qualiﬁed retirement plans. The
committee bill also continues the approach in present law
of encouraging the establishment of retirement plans
which contain socially desirable provisions through the
granting of tax inducements. In other words, under the new
legislation as under present law, no one is compelled to
establish a retirement plan. However, if a retirement plan is
to qualify for the favorable tax treatment, it will be required
to comply with speciﬁed new requirements which are
designed to improve the retirement system. Since the
favorable tax treatment is quite substantial, presently
involving a revenue loss of over $4 billion a year, it is
anticipated that plans will have a strong inducement to
comply with the new qualiﬁcation rules and thereby
become more effective in fulﬁlling their objective of
providing retirement income.’
‘[T]he committee is aware that under our voluntary
pension system, the cost of ﬁnancing pension plans is an
important factor in determining whether any particular
retirement plan will be adopted and in determining the
beneﬁt levels if a plan is adopted, and that unusually large
increases in costs could impede the growth and
improvement of the private retirement system. For this
reason, in the case of those requirements which add to the
cost of ﬁnancing retirement plans, the committee has
(continued )
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Appendix table 11.A1 Continued
Committee

Report Text
sought to adopt provisions which strike a balance between
providing meaningful reform and keeping costs within
reasonable limits.’
‘If employers respond to more comprehensive coverage,
vesting and funding rules by decreasing beneﬁts under
existing plans or slowing the rate of formation of new plans,
little if anything would be gained from the standpoint of
securing broader use of employee pensions and related
plans.’

House Committee on
Education & Labor
H.R. Rep. No. 533 1973: 1–2

‘The primary purpose of the bill is the protection of
individual pension rights, but the committee has been
constrained to recognize the voluntary nature of private
retirement plans. The relative improvements required by
this Act have been weighed against the additional burdens
to be placed on the system. While modest cost increases are
to be anticipated when the Act becomes effective, the
adverse impact of these increases have been minimized.
Additionally, all of the provisions in the Act have been
analyzed on the basis of their projected costs in relation to
the anticipated beneﬁt to the employee participant. In
broad outline, the bill is designed to: (1) establish equitable
standards of plan administration; (2) mandate minimum
standards of plan design with respect to the vesting of plan
beneﬁts; (3) require minimum standards of ﬁscal
responsibility by requiring the amortization of unfunded
liabilities; (4) insure the vested portion of unfunded
liabilities against the risk of premature plan termination;
and (5) promote a renewed expansion of private
retirement plans and increase the number of participants
receiving private retirement beneﬁts.’

House Committee on Ways
& Means
H.R. Rep. No. 807 1974: 2

‘The bill encourages provisions for the retirement needs of
many millions of individuals. At the same time, the
committee recognizes that private retirement plans are
voluntary on the part of employers, and, therefore, it has
weighed carefully the additional costs to employers and
minimized those costs to the extent consistent with
minimum standards for retirement beneﬁts. . . .
The bill continues to rely primarily on the tax laws to secure
needed improvements in pensions and related plans. In
general, it retains the tax incentives granted under present
law for the purpose of encouraging the establishment of
plans which contain socially desirable provisions. However,
it also improves the effectiveness of these tax incentives by
extending or increasing them in certain cases where this is
warranted and by pruning them where they have given rise
to problems.’

Sources: As indicated in this table.
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Endnotes
1. See Pegram v. Herdrich (2000: 225): ‘Professor Scott’s treatise admonishes that the
trustee “is not permitted to place himself in a position where it would be for his
own beneﬁt to violate his duty to the beneﬁciaries.” Under ERISA, however, a
ﬁduciary may have ﬁnancial interests adverse to beneﬁciaries’. Langbein (2007:
1327): ‘This concession to employer interests, which departs notably from the
trust tradition, was motivated by the concern that without it employers would be
less likely to sponsor beneﬁt plans. Because pension and welfare beneﬁt plans
entail major expenditures, the sponsor community prefers to have its own managers administering and monitoring plan operations for cost containment, a
traditional management function’ (footnotes omitted).
2. ‘To preserve and encourage ESOPs, Congress exempted ﬁduciaries of ESOPs
from the duty to diversify and limited the duty of prudence so as not to require
diversiﬁcation for such plans.’
3. See, for example, Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer (2014: 21): ‘Congress, in
seeking to permit and promote ESOPs, was pursuing purposes other than the
ﬁnancial security of plan participants’; In re Citigroup ERISA Litig. (2011: 137):
‘Due to the risk inherent in employees’ placing their retirement assets in a single,
undiversiﬁed stock fund, Congress has expressed concern that its goal of encouraging employee ownership of the company’s stock could “be made unattainable
by regulations and rulings which treat employee stock ownership plans as conventional retirement plans” ’; (Steinman v. Hicks 2003: 1103): ‘Congress, believing
employees’ ownership of their employer’s stock is a worthy goal, has encouraged
the creation of ESOPs both by giving tax breaks and by waiving the duty ordinarily
imposed on trustees by modern trust law (including ERISA) to diversify the assets
of a pension plan’ (citations omitted); Moench v. Robertson (1995: 568): ‘Under
their original rationale, ESOPs were described as . . . devices for expanding the
national capital base among employees—an effective merger of the roles of
capitalist and worker. Thus, the concept of employee ownership constituted a
goal in and of itself. To accomplish this end, Congress . . . enacted a number of
laws designed to encourage employers to set up such plans’ (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
4. For years preceding 2005, EBSA used data that excluded (1) individuals who were
eligible to participate in a §401(k) plan but who did not elect to have contributions made on their behalf and (2) non-vested former employees who had not yet
completed the plan’s break-in-service period. For 2005 and subsequent years,
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EBSA has relied on data that treat these individuals as ‘active participants.’ EBSA
has stated, however, that because these individuals are not contributing to the
plan and are not entitled to receive beneﬁts under the plan, EBSA has adjusted
the reported active participant counts to provide more meaningful statistics. ‘In a
purely economic sense, and for research purposes, individuals in these groups
should not be included in the count of active participants’ (EBSA 2013: 40–1).
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